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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 2007, the College of William & Mary announced a
"compromise" solution to its polite civil war over the historic Wren
Chapel.' In a joint statement with President Gene Nichol,2 the
Board of Visitors declared that permanent display of the Christian
cross within the Chapel would resume.3 The cross would be moved,
however, from its former place at center stage on the Chapel altar.4
Accompanying the relocated display would be a plaque "explaining
the College's Anglican roots."' The compromise further provided
that, when needed during certain worship services, the cross could
be moved back to the altar.6 When needed for other worship
services, "[o]ther religious symbols, ... stored in the sacristy when
not in use, will also be welcome. The Board of Visitors observed
that, in this way, the '"Wren Chapel will continue to play its unique
historic and affirming role in the life of the College."' The compro-
mise was unanimously recommended by the William & Mary
Committee on Religion in a Public University, and the Board of
Visitors "accept[ed]" and "immediately" began to implement it. 9
President Nichol said that he "fully embrace[d] it."' Peace was
restored to campus.
But was forging a "compromise" the right way to deal with the
Wren Chapel display and the issues it raised? Part I of this Essay
argues that, according to President Nichol's definition of what was
1. Press Release, Joint Statement by Gene R. Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary,
and the William & Mary Board of Visitors, President and Board Accept Committee
Recommendation on Wren Cross (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.wm.edulnewsf.
id=7456 [hereinafter Joint Statement of the President and Board].
2. President Nichol resigned from his position on February 12, 2008. See Press Release,
Statement from Gene Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary (Feb. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=8672.
3. Joint Statement of the President and Board, supra note 1.
4. Id. ('The [permanent display] case shall be located in a prominent, readily visible
place.").
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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at stake, "compromising" was wrong; it was tantamount to accepting
defeat of an important moral principle. This Part also shows how
Nichol's organizing moral principle-that everyone should feel
equally welcome in the Wren Chapel-is wrong, too.
Part II criticizes Nichol's reliance upon feelings--of being
unwelcome-as the relevant data for applying his principle. In fact,
both sides described their positions principally in terms of feelings
-of belonging to or of estrangement from the College according
to one's feelings about the Wren Chapel. This bipartisan concep-
tualization of the issue was wrong, and it also made compromise
inevitable.
Part III revisits Nichol's position. Nichol did not present the
controversy as a matter of constitutional law, nor did he cite legal
compulsion in favor of his view. His arguments nonetheless mimic
a leading Establishment Clause test for unconstitutionality: the so-
called "endorsement" test first articulated by Justice O'Connor in
1984.11 This Part criticizes the endorsement test on grounds that
apply to Nichol's asserted reasons for moving the cross. This Part
also proposes an alternative constitutional norm about religion,
including religion in public universities.
Part IV shows that, although the "compromise" ended a disagree-
ment, it resolved no disputed issue and shed no light on the wider
problem to which Nichol and others expressly connected the cross
imbroglio: "the role of religion in public universities in general."12
The key missing ingredient in the Wren Chapel debate was any
articulated conception of William & Mary's basic mission, its
institutional common good as a public university. This common good
has nothing to do with the rhetoric of inclusiveness. This common
good is not about anyone's feelings of belonging, of being "welcome,"
or of alienation upon seeing the cross, contrary to the arguments of
both Nichol and his critics.13 William & Mary's mission consists of
an objective, critically justified account of the university's common
11. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. Gene R. Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary, State of the College Address (Jan.
25, 2007), available at http://www.wm.edu/news/index.php?id=7262 [hereinafter State of the
College Address].
13. See infra Part I.
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good. This is the principle of the university constituents' unity, and
the justifying principle of all the university's authoritative acts.
Part V describes three principles that govern and specify the role
of religion in a public university. Part VI defends the claims made
in Part V against an objection arising from a particular understand-
ing of how universities are related to the truth, including the truth
of religion. This objection founders upon a mistaken extension of the
axiomatic skepticism of the internal intellectual life of the College,
as a "marketplace of ideas," into an overall institutional stance.
Finally, the Conclusion tries to answer the questions raised by
the Wren Cross controversy in light of the three principles specified
in Part V.
I. NICHOL'S PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL 'WELCOME"
President Nichol touched off the campus debate in October, 2006,
when he decided to end permanent display of the Christian cross
on the Wren Chapel altar. 4 The Wren is a College-owned campus
building with long-standing ties to the Episcopal Church. Its
specifically Christian character was, and is, indelible and obvious.
All parties to the controversy agreed that the Wren Chapel is a
unique and special space, due to its long history as an adjunct of the
College, its sublime appearance, and its religious ambience. Nichol
characterized the Wren Chapel as William & Mary's "most revered
space."' 5
Nichol justified his decision on the basis of negative reactions
to it. His anecdotal reasons included that some a capella singers
were "discomfited" by the cross,'" and that a Jewish student
"vow[ed] never to return" to the Wren Chapel.1" The instigating
object of these reactions shifted, however, with the reports. Some of
14. Nichol confirmed in an October 27, 2006 e-mail to students that, earlier that month,
he had ordered the cross removed from the altar save on Sundays. E-mail from Gene R.
Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary, to Students of the Coll. of William & Mary (Oct.
27, 2006), available at http://www.savethewrencross.org/nicholsemail.php.
15. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary, to William & Mary
Faculty, Staff, and Students (Dec. 20,2006), available at http://www.wm.edulnews/index.php?
id=7102.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the anecdotes pertained to the Chapel and some specifically to the
cross. Nichol remarked, in relating the reports, upon the "fact" that
the Chapel was "only available as a Christian space."' 8
Nichol announced that the Chapel status quo was therefore
"contrary to the best values of the College."' 9 He said that the
"unmistakable message that the Chapel belongs more fully to some
of us than to others" had to be corrected.2" It was "essential [that
the Wren Chapel] belong to everyone" at the College.2" It had to be
"equally open and welcoming to every member of this community."22
Nichol focused on the cross because it was "in the heart of our most
important and defining building. '23 He implied that display of the
cross entailed the existence of a caste system at William & Mary:
"insiders and outsiders"; those who are welcome and those who are
"only tolerated."24 But "[i]n the College's family there should be no
outsiders."25
For Nichol, one "outsider" was one too many; nothing less than a
robustly equal-and universal-sense of belonging to William &
Mary through the Wren Chapel would do. "Compromise" could only
be, for Nichol, a betrayal of principle.
Nichol's position is mistaken. It is not mistaken because it is not
amenable to compromise. Some moral requirements really do permit
no exceptions; one "exception" would indeed be one too many. The
most basic human rights of students and everyone else at the school
must be respected, no matter what. No college should permit certain
forms of human experimentation or tolerate faculty-student sexual
relationships. The problem with Nichol's position is that precisely
those features that make it uncompromising are deeply mistaken.
Before looking more critically at Nichol's position, it is good to
stop and take it in whole. In outline form it is this: upon hearing
18. Id.
19. Gene R. Nichol, President, Coll. of William & Mary, Statement Before the Board of
Visitors (Nov. 20,2006), available at http://www.wm.edu/news/index.php?id=7026 [hereinafter
Statement of Gene R. Nichol].
20. Id. Of course, the needed "correction" could well have been for the College to schedule
fewer non-religious events in the Chapel.
21. Id.
22. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Statement of Gene R. Nichol, supra note 19.
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that some students had negative reactions to the Wren Chapel,
Nichol concluded straightaway that assuaging those feelings was his
overriding obligation. The external stimulus or occasion of those
feelings would have to be fixed, or removed if necessary. And that
was that. This is a very odd and most improbable way to think.
To see how odd, try substituting in our narrative for a "cross in
the Chapel" some other aspect of collegiate life-football, or an
observatory, or an art gallery, or a sexually explicit show, or a
dogmatic professor-and ask: what would Nichol do?
Let us say, for example, that a few students report that football
is a stupid and violent game that perpetuates a macho culture on
campus. They say further that football makes them sick, especially
when the team loses. Would Nichol terminate the football program
without further ado? Or suppose that some other students complain
that the campus observatory is an expensive investment in useless
gazing-a morally offensive line item, the opportunity costs of which
include leaving many urgent terrestrial problems unattended.
Would Nichol shut down the observatory? Let us say now that still
other students complain of an upper-class bias at this public
university supported by all taxpayers. They cite as Exhibit A the art
gallery's big budget for modern art, which these students find
offensive and uselessly effete. Would Nichol sell all the paintings,
and give the proceeds to the poor?
We need not speculate about what Nichol would do in the case of
a sexually explicit show. A "Sex Workers' Art Show" occurred on the
William & Mary campus during the course of the cross dispute.26 In
response to widespread criticism of the College's willingness to
give it space, Nichol said, "I don't like this kind of show and I don't
like having it here .... But it's not the practice and province of
universities to censor or cancel performances because they are
controversial."27 Of course, the objection was not that the show was
controversial, and that it should be cancelled for that reason. The
objection was, basically, that the show was degrading and immoral,
and that the College for that reason should give it no quarter.
Neither the fact that the show became controversial nor objectors'
26. FOXNews.com, College of William and Mary Hosts Sex Worker Show on Campus (Feb.
23, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,254142,00.html.
27. Id. (alteration in original).
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feelings of disgust were the basis for the objection. Nichol nonethe-
less decided that, in this case, strong feelings of estrangement from
William & Mary would have to be tolerated for a greater good.
Finally, what if a large number of students petitioned Nichol to
fire a strident and, in their view, dogmatic feminist professor who
made them feel like menacing neanderthals in class? Assume that
the complainants are all male. Would Nichol begin disciplinary
proceedings against the professor to assuage these students' injured
psyches? Or would he stand fast by the status quo, patiently explain
the concept and value of academic freedom to the disgruntled
students, and frankly advise them to accept such intellectual bumps
as part of the college experience?
We can be sure that none of these deeply felt student reactions
would lead Nichol-or any other public college president-to
straightaway grant the relief requested. Even after due consider-
ation, most university administrators would turn dissidents away
empty handed. These scenarios do not imply that Nichol was wrong
to move the cross upon hearing some student complaints about it.
They show, however, that his decision was either a knee-jerk
reaction, or that it rested upon unacknowledged heavy analytical
lifting.
Assuming that Nichol would not jettison football, astronomy, art,
or academic freedom even if each of them irritated a lot of students,
we can be sure that he would be depending upon some set of
considerations and arguments that distinguishes all of them from
the cross. For Nichol's conclusion about the Chapel surely implies
or presupposes that the cross-if not larger elements of the Wren
Chapel's Christian ambience-is not worth the price of irritating
anyone.
Let us now look carefully, and more critically, at the moral norm
that Nichol articulated and upon which he crucially relied: that
there should be no "insider" or "outsider" at William & Mary, no
"second-class" citizens inhabiting the campus. Call the subject
matter of the remainder of Part I the reality of anyone's understand-
ing of himself or herself as opposed to, or in lively tension with, the
college at which he or she studies or works. The reader will see more
clearly what I mean by reality in the following paragraphs. In the
next Section, this Essay considers the aggravating factor of Nichol's
2008] 2223
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reliance upon reported feelings as sufficient evidence that someone
is an "outsider."
A. "Outsiders" Are Inevitable-And Not Always Regrettable
The reality of estrangement is often a reaction to some practice
that the institution is duty-bound to continue. Outspoken professors
often irritate students and frequently rankle faculty colleagues.
Sound college leadership nevertheless recognizes that these neg-
ative reactions are a price that must be paid. Indeed, academic free-
dom often costs colleges alumni donations and support. Academic
integrity and standards lead to even more feelings of being an
"outsider" and second-class. Students who receive failing grades,
professors who teach poorly and publish rarely, and maybe the
losing football coach whose players rarely graduate all should feel
alienated. They are not fulfilling their responsibilities to the college
and, maybe, to themselves. They ought to receive signals that they
are underachieving, that they are not good enough.
Many valuable contributors to the life of a public university
understandably-though not inevitably and surely not deservedly
-feel unwelcome and underappreciated. They feel like second-
class citizens, and in a certain limited sense, they are. The dining
hall waitstaff, dorm janitors, secretaries, other clerical help, and
groundskeepers, among many others, understandably feel unappre-
ciated when they look at the university's website, which celebrates
the feats of professors and white-collar employees. They look at
their paychecks and feel underpaid. They look in the mirror and see
"outsiders."
Responsible university leadership must do what it can to
ameliorate these feelings, to convey to all who make the place what
it is the gratitude to which their efforts entitle them, and to
publicize the invaluable contributions of the blue-collar staff to the
whole university community. But neither justice nor the common
good requires equal pay and renown for famous researchers and
campus security, even though the gap between the two groups on
most campuses is scandalous and should be dramatically narrowed.
One has to expect that many of the less-celebrated campus workers
2224 [Vol. 49:2217
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will, no matter what, think they are taken for granted. In truth,
they are more easily replaced than accomplished professors.
Important campus symbols and rituals may also be worth the
price of alienation. If precisely the controversy at William & Mary
happened instead over display of the American flag, or just because
the campus's "most revered space" is called a "Chapel," or because
the university is named for two long-dead, rich, white Christian
monarchs, neither President Nichol nor the Board of Visitors would
have removed the source of alienation. Even now, some students
might object to the College's "most revered space" and its still
pungent Christian ambience. What would Nichol and the Board of
Visitors do then?
Sometimes college leadership has to hazard estrangement it
causes by sticking to its own limited competence. Suppose that
hundreds of William & Mary students stage a "sit-in" in the Wren
Chapel next week, demanding that the College condemn the war in
Iraq. They presumably would be denied their demand, no matter
how disaffected it would make them feel. This unpopular adminis-
trative decision would be justified, not as agreement with the war,
but because of the institution's particular character as educational,
and not political.
Take the example now of another Virginia public institution of
higher learning. Suppose that a pacifist somehow enrolled at
Virginia Military Institute (VMI). He or she would surely possess
bad feelings about the cannons strewn about the campus, about the
cult of "Stonewall" Jackson that envelops the institution, and all
the other martial trappings of that military school. These feelings
arise naturally; there is no doubt that, in every useful sense of
the term, our pacifist is an "outsider." Yet, there is nothing neces-
sary, inevitable, or, perhaps, wise about a state-supported military
training college. It could be different; aside from Virginia, only a few
states have them.28 Virginia, and South Carolina, which supports
28. South Carolina is the only other state that maintains a separate military academy in
The Citadel. Several states support dual-purpose institutions that have both a corps of cadets
and a traditonal student body. They are: Georgia (North Georgia College), Texas (Texas
A&M), Vermont (Norwich University), and Virginia (Virginia Tech).
The Federal government supports the national service academies (Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Coast Guard). Unlike the state-supported military schools and corps, these academies
require graduates to serve in the U.S. military upon graduation. As such, the example of the
2008] 2225
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The Citadel. Someone might therefore address the obviously bad fit
between our uncomfortable pacifist and the contingent and, maybe,
debatable mission of VMI with an open question: which of the two
must adapt? But very few would, and I do not. The decision to
found VMI as a military institution was made long ago, and if it is
to be revisited, it should not be-and surely will not be-because a
pacifist feels unwelcome there. VMI simply is not the place for
everyone. And there is an end to it.
B. Volunteer "Outsiders"
Nichol was motivated to move the cross by some idea about
equality: everyone should feel "equally" welcome at the Wren
Chapel. No one should be an "outsider" or a "second-class" citizen.
But the fact is that not everyone wants to be an "insider." Many
cultivate in exquisite detail their position as "outsiders."
There are contrarians in almost every group of people.
Contrarians are people who oppose the best efforts of others to make
them feel at home. Many persons in any institutional setting will
consciously seek to establish an identity precisely over and against
the institution most dominant in their lives. Anyone who has raised
teenagers knows that parents are often a negative reference for
their offsprings' fitful attempts to establish their own identities.
Anyone who has lived on a college campus will recognize that
many students strive to "define" themselves precisely as out of the
mainstream. They want to be rebels, nonconformists. They show it
in their dress, attitude, demeanor, habits. Does anyone think that
the "goths" on campus really want to be ghouls? Or do they just
want to be different, and, most especially, not what the authorities
want them to be? Many college students who are, in truth, quite
conventional and predictable will protest, if challenged, that they
most certainly are not.
There is, in other words, an unpredictable dialectic between
institutional membership and personal identity. This is especially
the case with young adults; the dialectic is especially unpredictable
protesting pacifist on campus would be inapposite, as pacifists are not permitted to
matriculate at any of the national service academies.
[Vol. 49:22172226
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when it comes to religion. Put the case of young adults and religious
identity together, and you have real turbulence.
How so? Religious believers characteristically affirm the existence
of transcendent realities that become, for them, overriding sources
of meaning and value. Religions vary greatly in their tendencies to
motivate adherents to immerse themselves in this world as a form
of religious duty. In some faith traditions, good works are the keys
to salvation. In others, the whole material world constitutes a vale
of tears, a source of irredeemable misery, and an impediment to the
spiritual quest. In these faith traditions, escape from this world is
the key: withdrawal from mundane affairs and cultivation of that
detachment we associate with the connotations of terms such as
"otherworldly" and "sectarian." Depending on where a particular
faith tradition falls along this axis, that faith stimulates more or
less ambivalence about earthly attachments, human institutions,
and identification with mundane projects.
Religious belief fosters "outsider" consciousness. The language of
faith is often the language of dissent. The stance of belief is often
the stance of opposition--of antagonism towards human authority
and institutions, especially towards public authority and institu-
tions. Religious people are often ambivalent precisely about feeling
welcome and comfortable "inside" this earthly city. This ambiva-
lence is perhaps most intense about the state's institutions.29
Christians have an especially rich vocabulary for expressing
this ambivalence. Christians say of themselves that they are '"in'
the world but not 'of' it," that the Kingdom of God is "already but
not yet," and that they "live between the times."30 They describe
themselves as "pilgrim[s]" and "sojourn[ers]" because they have no
final resting place here. 1 They express the leading social conse-
quence of this reality as the distinction between two Kingdoms, or
as that between the "City of God" and the "City of Man," and the
difference between things that are Caesar's and things that are
God's." Stated more discursively, and perhaps most famously, by
29. See generally R. LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICANS (1986).
30. Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church
and State, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1074 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1057, 1085.
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Pope Gelasius I in his late fifth century letter to Byzantine Emperor
Anastasius: "[T]here are [two powers], August Emperor, by which
this world is ruled ... the corrected authority of the priesthood and
the royal power."3 This distinction is the conceptual and historical
progenitor of our First Amendment's separation of church and
state.34
Imagine, now, how the ordinary ups and downs of human
development between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two super-
vene upon these religious variables. Mix equal measures of a state
institution such as William & Mary, religious environs such as
the Wren Chapel, and the personal identity difficulties of young
adults, and the result is one potent cocktail indeed. Add a top-shelf
satisfaction level-everyone feels equally at home, or as if they
really belong-and you have a recipe for failure.
C. 'All in the Family"
The rhetorical counterpart of Nichol's "equally welcome" moral
norm was a nest of images he used to describe the unity of
those involved with William & Mary. He describe them as "family. 35
He stressed repeatedly how the Wren Chapel defined everyone,
and that it must do so "equally. ' 36 All of these images, and the same-
class citizenship norm they were meant to burnish, grossly
misrepresent the extent and nature of the bonds that distinguish
the William & Mary community.
It is right for any group's leaders to stress that all human
relationships are to be governed by justice and charity. This is true
for colleges as well as for families, and for corporations, labor
unions, neighborhood groups, communes, sports teams, cities, and
states. This truth, however, does not mean that the New York
Yankees or all Albanians are just like "families." It is also true that
leaders of all kinds of organizations today inappropriately use fa-
milial imagery, and that they do so without apology or shame.37 This
33. Id. at 1085 (quoting J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 202 (1960)).
34. See id.
35. See supra text accompanying note 25.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
37. Two such examples are the "FedEx family" and the "Notre Dame family." See, e.g.,
FedEx: Careers, https://gatewaybeta.fedex.com/us/careers/companies/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2228 [Vol. 49:2217
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growing practice does not make such rhetoric right. Promiscuous
family-speak may be harmless at retirement dinners or during
misty-eyed reunions. But it is often harmful, and even insidious,
because the unity of a family is very different than the unity of a
college, including the College of William & Mary.
Families are characterized by parental authority; unconditioned
love and loyalty, which thus do not depend upon successful perfor-
mances; daily interaction outside the sway of formal rules; and
immunity from interference by law and public authority, in that
families are largely unregulated and thus "private." None of these
features characterizes a public university. Authority at a univer-
sity is a combination of consensus, especially among faculty, and
ordinary workplace norms within the administration. In loco
parentis went out long ago even in cases in which it made consider-
able sense, as it does in the residential life of students. Families are
bound up by ties of affection and love that, if they were cultivated
by leaders of public institutions, would lead to intolerable and even
legally actionable relationships. Universities are heavily regulated
nonprofit legal corporate entities, encumbered by reams of red tape
concerning student records, health and safety, employment policies,
tax matters, and fundraising practices. Families are not.
Any college that pays more than lip service to itself as a "family"
is headed for ruin-and for a lot of lawsuits. Yet any college that
pays only lip service communicates deep confusion about its
identity. Lip service to "family values" is inescapably manipulative
as well. It is a rhetoric that always misleads because it is not true,
can only be selectively employed, and is trotted out usually by those
in charge to stifle criticism of them or to otherwise get their way.3"
Nichol's usage of "family" is not pardonable because it was not an
isolated rhetorical flourish. His entire argument was suffused by
hyper-inflation of what William & Mary means, and of what binds
together its constituents. Nichol's key strategic claim was that
2008) (inviting job-seekers to "[j]oin the FedEx family"); Wally Suphap, The Notre Dame
Community: A Divided Family (Dec. 12, 1997), available at http://www.nd.edu/-frswrite/
mcpartlinI1998/suphap.shtml.
38. Besides, in even the best of real families there are favored sons and black sheep.
Remember the Old Testament story of Joseph and his coat of many colors? In even the most
highly motivated and select group of co-workers, there can be petty jealousy and envy.
Remember the New Testament story of the apostles vying for pride of place in Jesus's eyes?
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the Wren Chapel "defines us. And it must define us all."39 Taken
literally, the claim is nonsense. Neither William & Mary nor the
Wren Chapel "defines" anyone. Everyone associated with William &
Mary is very largely defined by beliefs, experiences, relationships,
and circumstances that have nothing whatsoever to do with William
& Mary. These defining influences include one's parents, upbring-
ing, religious and ethnic heritages, pre-college education, friends
and aspirations, and, of course, one's religious beliefs.
Perhaps Nichol meant to say that everyone associated with
William & Mary is partly defined by association, and that part of
everyone's William & Mary experience has to do with the Wren
Chapel. Nichol might also have meant to say that the association
should be positive for everyone. This is an unattainable, if not
absurd, aim. Neither Nichol nor anyone else can make the Wren
Chapel into a positive point of reference for everyone. Everyone's
identity-self-definition-is a work in progress, the product of in-
terplay between oneself and one's surroundings, a process of
invention, discovery, reaction, adjustment, and reevaluation, both
conscious and unconscious. Even the person whose identity it is
neither commands nor wholly understands the process. Much less
is it possible for anyone else to control what a particular experience
means to me, or to you, or to anyone else.
In any group in which membership is vetted only for a limited set
of skills (say, hitting a baseball or nailing the SAT), or owes largely
to status (for example, a craft worker or a Virginia resident), it is
foolish to expect "equal" reception of any symbol's allure. There is
no reason whatsoever to think that, if one assembled the one
hundred smartest or fastest people in Virginia, they would all
somehow equally view the Mona Lisa, The Godfather, or even
Seinfeld positively. It is just as naive-and maybe very strange-to
expect that if the Wren Chapel were stripped bare of all furnish-
ings-or filled to the brim with the finest materials-it would
stimulate positive responses in all the College's students, staff,
faculty, and alumni.
Closing official communications with the exhortation, "Go Tribe"4
-as Nichol did during the cross fracas-might help solidify a group
39. Statement of Gene R. Nichol, supra note 19.
40. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
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by striking the right chord for some hearers. But for those who
judge the phrase to be lame, sophomoric, laden with testosterone,
slightly offensive to Native Americans, or simply false because the
unity of the campus does not, in truth, resemble that of a "tribe," it
is off-putting, and makes them feel like "outsiders." Indeed, this
example illustrates how Nichol's unity overreach is intrinsically
unstable. Members of a college community do not enter a family or
a tribe, and do not think of themselves as doing so. Many of them
will therefore reject, more or less vehemently, leaders' attempts to
tell them what their bonds to others on campus amount to. Is not a
stakeholder who rejects the leadership's definition of his or her
community as a "family" an "outsider?"
These observations do not mean that modifying any symbol's
presentation is always wrong or irrational. It is rather to say that
doing so in order to render its effects uniform and uniformly posi-
tive is empirically impossible. These observations do not implicitly
deny the fact-and it is a fact-that many leaders, especially college
heads, cultivate group cohesion by setting up iconic symbols and
rituals, and then by encouraging attachment to them. Colleges have
bonfires, fight songs, statues, and scenic founding narratives for
these reasons. College leaders promote sports teams partly to foster
community solidarity around something hopefully noncontroversial.
These practices are understandable and morally unobjectionable.
But, if this is what President Nichol was trying to do with the Wren
Chapel, he made an exceedingly poor and miscalculated choice of
icons.
II. THE MISPLACED RELIANCE ON "FEELINGS"
Opposition to Nichol's decision to remove the cross from the Wren
Chapel altar arose immediately after he announced it. 4 The ensuing
debate chiefly pitted Nichol, with much support among the faculty,
against influential alumni and donors.42 Critics claimed the Wren
41. Within days of the announcement, alumni began organizing to "seek the reversal" of
Nichol's decision. Save the Wren Cross, http://www.savethewrencross.orglabout.php (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008).
42. See Andrew Petkofsky, Petition: Help Save W&M's Wren Cross; Discussion Is Lively
as Bid Is Launched To Return Relic to Chapel, RICHMOND TIMEs-DSPATCH, Nov. 9, 2006, at
B-2.
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Chapel as a focal point of their identification with William & Mary.
For them, Nichol's move was about inclusion and exclusion.4 But
Nichol's decision made them feel like second-class citizens.
Critics connected to their William & Mary through "storied
traditions,"" and the Chapel of their memory was central to those
traditions. The Board of Visitors articulated this intimacy between
past experience and contemporary identification in a February 8,
2007 intervention: "We love [the College's] history and tradition....
We love our experiences and the memories that have made indelible
marks on our lives.... It is the depth of this feeling that explains why
so much passion has come to the surface over this issue.'4
The implicit stipulation on both sides was that all the students,
faculty, alumni, and Board members were valued institutional
stakeholders. All of their respective senses of feeling welcome
and of being "included" or "excluded" were presumptively valid.
Certainly Nichol affirmed this universal entitlement; it was the
linchpin of his position. No one's feelings were to be critically
evaluated and disregarded as groundless, overblown, or hysterical.
None was to be affirmed as intrinsically more important or correct
than another's. These were the obvious ground rules in the Wren
Chapel debate. The cross was therefore jinxed to be Janus-faced,
pointing this way and that-"out" and "in"--at the same time.
Critics adhering to their "storied traditions" pushed Nichol back
two steps. He retreated perceptibly from his earliest explanation
for moving the cross, to make the Chapel somehow welcoming to
nonreligious people and a venue suitable for what he called "secu-
lar" events. Nichol also set in motion a process to have his decision
reviewed. On January 25, 2007, he announced the creation of a
"presidential committee" to study the "role of religion in public
universities," and the "use of the historic Wren Chapel" in particu-
lar.4" Nichol said, adumbrating the eventual "compromise," that the
43. See Save the Wren Cross, Letters to Nichol, http://www.savethewrencross.orgblog
index.php?catid=6&blogid=l (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
44. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
45. Press Release, Coll. of William & Mary Bd. of Visitors, Statement of the College of
William & Mary Board of Visitors (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.wm.edu/news.i
d=7324 [hereinafter Board of Visitors Statement].
46. State of the College Address, supra note 12.
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committee "will be balanced."47 He presented the faculty co-chairs
as, somehow, the embodiment of that balance.4"
The cross controversy took shape at a busy intersection of
conflicting emotional and psychic aspirations and attachments.
The basic subject matter comprised feelings of being included or
excluded, feelings made incompatible by virtue of their common
stimulus: the Chapel, and especially its cross. For some stake-
holders-the students whose reports Nichol cited-the cross
impeded full embrace of William & Mary. For others, the cross
facilitated and cemented their embrace. The William & Mary of
their affections had a religious heritage. Recollection of it was part
of the College's "storied traditions."
What is most remarkable about this set of understandings is the
utter opacity of the religious symbol at its center, a symbol univer-
sally recognized and understood in our society to be about a
particular set of religious claims. For most people in our coun-
try-be they Christians or not-the cross is transparent for certain
affirmations about Jesus's suffering and death. At William & Mary,
however, the conversation never really penetrated the brass
surface of the cross. It was functionally not only Janus-faced, but
Sphinx-like.
Nichol said at one point that, for "Christians, like me, the cross
conveys an inspiring message of sacrifice, redemption and love."49
But he treated this account as his private understanding. He did not
attribute it to any other party. He stated that those who complained
about the display "did not say, of course, that the cross is an
offensive or antagonistic symbol."5 The problem was that the cross
was not their symbol. It was somebody else's.
Nichol's opponents did not defend the cross as a symbolic
representation of certain religious truths. One alumnus referred to
47. Id.
48. Id. The committee was co-chaired by Dr. James Livingston, Professor Emeritus of
Religion, and Alan Meese, Ball Professor of Law. William & Mary, Religion at a Public
University, http://www.wm.edulcommittee-onreligion/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). I do not
know either of the two faculty chairs. But I would be very surprised if they were not well-
known around campus, respectively, as-in some important sense-a "conservative" and a
"liberal."
49. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
50. Id.
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his "faith," but spoke of it within Nichol's rhetoric of inclusion.51
This alumnus said that Nichol essentially had called the "most
potent and important symbol of any Christian's faith ... exclusionary
and unwelcoming." 2 In doing so, "the president has clearly pro-
nounced that my family, and its Christian faith tradition, is no
longer welcome here."53
"Storied traditions" was the lodestar phrase of Nichol's opponents.
Now, considered as the practices and beliefs of times past and
the memories we have of them today, "traditions" can be-and
frequently are-a valuable component of personal and corporate
identity. 'Traditions" help to distinguish any community or person
as unique beings. But even the most cherished "traditions" are not
debate winners-or losers, or stoppers. They are not trump cards.
"Storied traditions" are subject to continuing critical appraisal and
reevaluation in light of sound moral norms and contemporary facts,
including, to a limited extent, the hostile feelings a "tradition" might
today engender. This can easily be seen if one substitutes for the
cross at the center of this controversy the Confederate battle flag, or
the hard-drinking fraternity hazing rituals of yesteryear.
Facts about the past and current affection for them are not, to put
it differently, reasons for action, any more than feelings of exclusion
are. All these feelings and facts may serve as premises in a chain of
reasoning that ends in the conclusion that "the cross shall be
moved," or the conclusion that "the cross shall remain." But there
is no logical possibility of any "ought to" conclusion emerging from
any string of strictly factual premises, including premises involving
"storied traditions."
The Wren Chapel cross controversy was a zero-sum game.
Subtract the cross and you subtract some people's affection; leave
the cross alone and you suffer the continued loss of others'. One
person's exclusion was another person's inclusion. The "debate" at
William & Mary consisted of registering everyone's feelings on
this or that side of the ledger. And there was an end to it. But
51. Bob Thompson, Alumnus, Coll. of William & Mary, Address to William & Mary Rector,
President, and Board of Visitors (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.wm.edu/committee_
onreligionlstatements/thompsonfeb8.php.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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simply stacking up feelings of one sort-alienation-against those
of another sort-affection for tradition-leads nowhere. One could,
I suppose, pick one sort of feeling over another, and thereby settle
the matter. But this settlement would have no validity or value, for
it would be strictly a fact about you or me: "I am a traditionalist," or
"You like underdogs," or "Neither of us lives in the past."
Mutual concession was the only way out. There was no non-
arbitrary way to side decisively with one set of stakeholders over the
other. To do so would be a blowout, and could only be seen as the
very uncharitable exercise of raw power.
We can see now that neither the instigating symbol nor the
attraction or repugnance it engendered was transparent for any
meaningful set of propositions or, even, sentences. The cross was
reduced to an occasion of feeling or, at most, the subject of an
intelligible stance. For example, "I connect with the College through
the cross," or "I don't." This posture exemplifies what I call the
"transparency" problem in discourse and disagreement, and it is
not only stifling of genuine debate, but it is subversive of genuine
community.
Sometimes when one expresses one's judgment that viewing
hardcore pornography or recreational use of narcotics or adultery or
abortion is wrong, one might say that it is "my" view or part of "my
moral code." This way of speaking is an innocent locution for the
proposition, for example, "Pornography is simply wrong." This way
of speaking can be misleading, however, when used in our culture
and law with their ambient moral subjectivism. When one says that
pornography is wrong, one is heard to say that it is "my" morality
that makes it wrong. The judgment that pornography is wrong is
then a report of a fact about the speaker-me. Of course, "your"
morality might be very different. The relevant fact about you would
be, too. How, then, do we talk about it?
Fortunately, no one really thinks that the fact of holding a view
is a reason for holding it. No one says that "I oppose this practice
because it is my view that I am opposing this practice." People mean
and usually say instead: "I am opposed to this practice because it is
wrong in the following way ... and that's my view." People mean and
usually make clear that the possessive in such sentences--"that's
my view "-is irrelevant to the validity of the proposition asserted.
2008] 2235
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Besides, most people who say that adultery, for example, is wrong,
mean that it is wrong for everyone, that it is objectively and
categorically immoral. Their statements of, "I believe that adultery
is wrong," or "My view is that adultery is wrong," are transparent
for the proposition that adultery is wrong. And they hold it on the
strength of reasons for which the announcement is transparent.
Of course, the proposition that adultery is wrong could be false.
If it is, its falsity is sufficient reason to discard the judgment and
everything it might entail. That the conviction was mine is no
reason for you or me to continue holding it. Once an asserted truth
is exposed as false, no one should continue to hold it. This is how
deliberation about what people living in a community should do
normally proceeds: people give and receive reasons, pertinent facts,
and arguments based thereon; they then expose flaws in each
other's positions, with a view to all adopting what emerges from
the exchange as the most reasonable proposal. As my colleague
John Finnis describes in these situations, "[o]ne is looking not at
oneself, one's attitudes and beliefs, as facts about oneself, but at the
proposition(s) under consideration, the reasons there are for
affirming it and the reason(s) it gives for action."54
The rhetoric of inclusiveness may have the look and sound and
feel of community about it. But, it really stifles deliberation, isolates
people from each other, and undermines any attempt at genuine
community. When a certain conclusion or belief is communicated as
a fact about me, or as mine, or as an opaque feature of my identity,
considerations of equality and common courtesy rule out critical
engagement of the proffered position. Challenging such a position
is tantamount to disrespecting or even attacking the person holding
it. Because attacking persons, as opposed to their positions, is
contrary to academic values, and is simply wrong, the rhetoric of
inclusiveness strangles in the cradle any possibility of critically
reasoning together about what to do.
A vicious and ultimately incoherent regress soon takes over.
Someone will soon say that a negative judgment about, say,
adultery is "just your view and it would be unfair to impose your
view upon someone who does not share it," but this evades the
54. John Finnis, On Hart's Way: Law as Reason and as Fact, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 52
(2007).
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matter asserted: adultery is wrong simpliciter, for you and me and
everybody. Saying "it's just your view" is also self-refuting, for the
judgment that imposing one's view on others is "wrong" is, one could
just as well say, merely your view of justice-and it would be wrong
for you to impose it on me.
Shared commitment to a critically justified common good-and
not individual feelings of belonging-is the sine qua non of any
community. Deliberation together about reasons for action-and not
the mutual disclosure of facts about oneself-is the lifeblood of that
community. As Finnis says, "because the first-person (practical)
viewpoint is concerned not, in the end, with facts about oneself but
with reasons (for action) available to anyone like me, it is the
domain of common good."55
III. NICHOL'S UNSPOKEN CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE
William & Mary is a state school. It is subject to First Amend-
ment constraints in favor of religious freedom. Gene Nichol is an
experienced academic constitutional lawyer. Nowhere did he cite,
however, legal compulsion to justify his decision to move the cross.
He did not cite the First Amendment or any church-state court
opinion in support of his actions.
One reason for Nichol's reticence may have been his knowledge
that the constitutionally suspect state action was more likely the
College's use of the Wren Chapel, and not the Chapel itself. There
is no doubt whatsoever that public universities may, consistent with
the Constitution, have houses of worship for particular religions on
campus, at least so long as the structures are maintained by the
faithful and not the state. Indeed, some accommodation of students'
worship needs is more or less constitutionally required. Thus,
negative student reaction to the presence of the Wren Chapel as an
Anglican worship space at William & Mary would be inappropriate,
maybe venal, and surely no reason at all to rearrange the Wren's
furnishings. In fact, the negative reactions cited by Nichol probably
owe to the Chapel's Anglicanism only in conjunction with the
55. Id.
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College's promotion of it as everyone's most revered space. Clearly
it is not.
Nichol nonetheless borrowed very heavily and, at times, verbatim
from constitutional analysis to justify his decision about the cross.
His master concept of all-around inclusiveness, as well as his
language of "insider" versus "outsider" and "second-class citizen-
ship," track step-by-step the so-called "endorsement" analysis. This
Part first describes this constitutional doctrine and then criticizes
it along lines revealing further weaknesses in Nichol's stance. This
Part goes on to propose and defend an alternative constitutional
norm, with particular regard to the role of religion in public
universities.
The "endorsement" test was first articulated by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor in a 1984 opinion about the display of a Christmas
nativity scene under public auspices.56 In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld Pawtucket, Rhode Island's creche, but only because its
religious content was muted by surrounding secular trappings
-Santa's sleigh, reindeer, candy-striped poles, and the like.57 The
whole ensemble amounted, in the Court's view, to an inclusive
seasonal display, and thus did not "endorse" religion.5"
The basic terms of the "endorsement" test were stated succinctly
in a 2005 Ten Commandments case: "By showing a purpose to favor
religion [as such], the government sends the ... message to ... non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are insiders, favored members."59 Showing such a purpose is to
perform a prohibited "endorsement" of religion.6"
The engine driving this concept is that the government must
always be scrupulously neutral "between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion."' The first part of this neutrality
56. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 671.
58. Id. at 671-72.
59. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 883-84.
61. Id. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). As Edward Rubin
has said, neutrality is "distinguishable from separationism, at least in theory, because it also
forbids government from favoring secularism over religion," Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics,
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-that among the many different faiths-represents a sound
understanding of the Establishment Clause, going all the way back
to the Founders. The other part is much more recent, and mistaken.
Adumbrated in the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education decision, 62
"neutrality" between religion and nonreligion became the constitu-
tional master principle in 1962, with the first school prayer decision,
Engel v. Vitale.6" Its present status is debatable. The "endorsement"
test as a rule of judicial decision is now precarious. It may command
a narrow majority of the Supreme Court, in that four Justices-
Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens-are firmly committed to it, with
Justice Kennedy's commitment unclear, or wavering.
There is an uncanny resemblance between Justice O'Connor's
last use of the "endorsement" analysis and the Wren Chapel
imbroglio, especially to the subtle but, in my view, ultimately mis-
guided attempts to shroud religion affirmations in the mists of
history. O'Connor said in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow,64 a case involving an atheist's challenge to the Pledge of
Allegiance, that the phrase "under God" "ties [us] to a history that
sustains this Nation even today."65 She illustrated her point by
reference to a passage from the 1989 case County of Allegheny v.
ACL U,66 in which the Court was concerned to not "sweep away all
government recognition and acknowledgment of the role of religion
in the lives of our citizens."67 But the Allegheny Court meant the
lives of today's citizens. Allegheny found room enough in the public
square for a frank recognition of religion and its role in the lives
of modern Americans. Allegheny was not about linking today's
secularized Americans with their more God-fearing ancestors, as
O'Connor seemed to suggest in Newdow. O'Connor was at least
flirting here with upholding the Pledge as a living affirmation of
some propositions about God, Providence, and America today. But
and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 35 (2005).
62. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
63. 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Gerard V. Bradley,
The Judicial Experiment with Privatizing Religion, 1 LIBERTY L. REv. 17 (2006).
64. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
65. Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
67. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
623).
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she could not quite let herself close the deal. She lapsed instead into
treating "under God" as, in effect, a storied tradition, all the while
struggling with the implications of her master principle-no
endorsement of religion. It was as if O'Connor embodied both sides
of the Wren Chapel debate.
O'Connor recognized that it was impossible to identify any "brief
solemnizing reference [that] encompass[es] every religious belief
expressed by any citizen of this Nation."6 Universal inclusion was
empirically unavailable. To uphold the Pledge, O'Connor could have
then turned to the Founders. For them, there was an objective
common good in religion. There were common benefits to promoting
belief in natural religion: religion was necessary to citizens' moral
virtue, and without citizens' moral virtue, republican government
was bound to fail. Whether some citizens felt left out or like they
were second-class was not especially pertinent, for the Founders
understood that everyone enjoyed the fruits of a God-fearing
citizenry. But to reason this way is to abandon the whole "endorse-
ment" conundrum. O'Connor was apparently not prepared to do so.
The "endorsement" test is, in one important respect, more supple
than Nichol's imitation version of it. The "endorsement" test in
constitutional cases includes an evaluative qualifier or sorting tool.
Nichol's test did not. The legal standard asks about a "reasonable
observer's" reaction to the sight of public religion.69 Some negative
reports about government proximity to religion could therefore be
disregarded as unfounded, misguided, even hysterical or picayune.
Nichol did not approach any of the reports upon which he relied in
such critical fashion.
The weakness in both the constitutional test and Nichol's is
still the same: it is tantamount to a heckler's veto because it is un-
tethered to any sound account of the relevant institutional common
good.7° As we saw in detail earlier, the fact that some people are put
off, even reasonably so, by an act of public authority is no cause to
abandon that course of action. It is, perhaps, an invitation to review
68. Id. at 42.
69. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. For a counter-argument, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be
Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2193, 2212-13 (2008) (arguing that the purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to afford a heckler's veto).
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things in light of a mission, or institutional common good. But no
more than that.
This Essay will now illustrate the point using the political sphere,
its common good, and dissenters. People in America are free to join
peace churches if they wish. But they all are compelled to pay taxes,
a substantial portion of which support the defense establish-
ment-and, in Virginia, VMI. This compulsion is not wrong. People
in America are free to opt out of the industrial economy, as the
Amish typically do. But it is not unfair to compel the Amish to pay
taxes to support certain industries, or to underwrite the common
good in legal institutions that supervise the modern economy and
settle disputes within it. Some Christians forswear reliance upon
the government court system altogether. These people believe that
religion requires them to first settle disputes fraternally and, if that
fails, turn the other cheek. Jehovah's Witnesses at one time denied
the legitimacy of all governments as mockeries of God's undivided
sovereignty over the whole universe. But making all these persons
pay for government institutions, including mechanisms for dispute
settlement, is not unfair. It is not unfair to make them serve as
jurors or referees, either, though doing so might prove to be
counterproductive. People in America are free to reject scientific
medicine, as Christian Scientists do. But it is not unfair to make
them pay Medicare and Medicaid taxes.
These examples all indicate that it is not unfair to make people
pay their fair share to underwrite what is objectively in the common
good. To argue otherwise is to give everyone, really, the opportunity
to veto what could be and often is a program or practice essential to
everyone's welfare-including that of the objector. Free-riding is
usually unfair to those who pay the bills. And it would certainly be
fundamentally unfair to the community for a pacifist to possess the
right to disarm our military.
We will see in succeeding Parts that a public university is obliged
by virtue of its supervision of a community's life to "endorse"
religion, and that its task as an institution of higher education at
least permits and strongly calls for this "endorsement." The "en-
dorsement" test does not really work, in other words, if you apply it
to public universities. The balance of this Part argues against a
reading of the Establishment Clause in any factual setting to
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prohibit "endorsing" religion. The "endorsement" test should be
altogether rejected.
The Founders most certainly did not mean to prohibit government
recognition of religion as a genuinely good thing, eminently worthy
of promotion and encouragement by public authority. The Founders
not only contemplated but actually practiced a creative partnership
between government and religious institutions for projects of
mutual interest which served the common good of political society.
The side constraints, or restrictive bylaws, of these partnership
agreements were, basically, two: no coercion of individual con-
science, and no favor towards any particular sect.71
The latter constraint was the Founders' most important insight
into religious liberty as a civil right. They saw that the truth about
sectarian matters-sacred doctrines, modes of worship, forms of
church polity, and rules for church membership in good stand-
ing-did not pertain to the common good. These matters could safely
be kept out of political life. They were not unimportant. Arbitrating
them need not, however, be the civil magistrate's task. Theologians
might contend over the details of faith and worship, but to the
statesman they could be treated as matters of opinion.
The most succinct Supreme Court statement of the Founders'
constitutional doctrine on religion is from Watson v. Jones. The
general principle of constitutional law on religious liberty was that
"[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect., 73 The Founders engineered
their constitutional plan for church and state around the word and
reality of sect. Views on such distinctly religious matters as the
content of creeds and books of doctrine; liturgy or modes of worship;
styles of church governance-that is, hierarchical or congregational,
or national, local, or regional; and internal church discipline-what
qualifies or disqualifies an adherent for community membership
-were all, in the law's eyes, to be treated as neither true nor false.
Doctrine, discipline, worship, and governance were within the
province of faith, characteristic of the sects. Contending accounts of
71. For an Accomodationist interpretation of the First Amendment, see AKHIL AMAR, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32-45 (1998).
72. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
73. Id. at 728.
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these matters were matters of opinion. Heresy and dogma were
theological concepts. They were not legally cognizable. The doctrines
of Presbyterians, Catholics, and Jews, for example, were neither
"dogma" nor "heresy"-even if adherents of those faiths said so of
the others, and even if, because some of the doctrines were incom-
patible, one or more of them actually had to be false.
The Founders took the possibility of religious truth seriously.
They put "sectarian" matters outside the competence of government,
but they did not thereby denigrate them. They stipulated a sort of
mental discipline for lawmakers. By and large they held that such
matters were propositions: assertions that could be either true or
false. The First Amendment meant that the truth or falsity of such
matters had to be put aside in civil affairs; the First Amendment
neither stipulated nor supposed that the truth or falsity of these
things existed. The First Amendment said that the validity of these
propositions was beyond the competence of public authority.
This is the constitutional principle governing religion in public
universities: no siding with one or another particular faith, no
institutional affirmation of the distinctive doctrines or disciplines of
any church as true, and no endorsement of any set of putatively
revealed truths. All such sectarianism is out of bounds. But this
norm leaves constitutionally available what Part V argues is
morally required of public university leaders-that they affirm the
value of religion in both the collegiate community and the intellec-
tual life of the school.
And thus the first principle of religion in public universities is
that religion is viewed the same as at a nonpublic school, except
that there may be no sectarian favor in a public university.
IV. THE FALSE "COMPROMISE"
Any compromise resembles the legal settlement of a civil action.
Parties to any compromise, by definition, get less than they hoped
for. But they also give up less than they might have lost. Parties to
a compromise characteristically decline to admit-as do parties to
a legal settlement-error or fault. Each party retains the right to
stand by the principles and claims that he or she originally asserted.
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The "compromise" over the Wren Chapel fits this description. It
is a contingent and arbitrary settlement; evidently, it was the price
of campus peace. The terms74 are carefully scripted stipulations. But
they are stillborn. They are untethered to any coherent viewpoint
from which a deeper logic or sense may be gathered, or out of which
a trajectory for future decisions could reliably be inferred. The
conspicuous eagerness with which the parties describe it as,
precisely, a "compromise"75 further evidences their wish to brand it
a mutual give-and-take. Everybody gained something; everybody
lost something.
But not quite everybody. One is tempted to say that the "compro-
mise" leaves atheists, agnostics, and anyone else whose religious
beliefs are not on offer in the revamped Wren "outside." This
temptation must be resisted. Nothing in Nichol's proffered rationale
for moving the cross depends upon any objector's religious beliefs,
or lack thereof. Some reports Nichol cited contained information
about an objector's religion. Some did not. For instance, the faith
commitments, if any, of those "discomfited" a cappella singers were
never revealed.76 Nothing in common sense or experience warrants
the inference that objectors must have been non-Christians. Most
Christians are not Anglicans, and many Christians might object to
the very particular portrayal of their faith inside the Chapel.
Additionally, nothing in the "compromise" quiets those whom Nichol
described as alienated, not by the Chapel, but by its connection to
the College.
Nichol reported that over eighteen months he had received a
"number" of complaints that display of the cross is "at odds" with
William & Mary's "role as a public institution."77 These reports were
not about a student's personal identity so much as they are
objections to William & Mary's institutional self-definition. Their
claim was that William & Mary was somehow caught up in religion,
especially the one on display at the Wren Chapel, in a way that it
should not have been. The "compromise" will not assuage their
74. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
75. See Joint Statement of the President and Board, supra note 1.
76. See E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
77. Id.
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objection. It did not reduce the Wren Chapel's religious character.
Its pride of place at William & Mary is intact.
Now these "outsiders" may be further marginalized. After all,
everyone else seems to have gotten over their slight and rejoined
the campus team. Why can't they do so, too? The presence of these
residual "outsiders" nonetheless makes the "compromise" unstable.
Sooner or later this reconstituted "outside" group will speak loud
enough to command the "inside" group's attention. Then the
"outside" group may demand that the cross display case be moved
into a side room or vestibule. They may not get their way. But there
is nothing in the "compromise" that counts as an argument against
them.
These objectors to William & Mary's relationship to the Wren
Chapel made a claim about what the College really ought to be
when it comes to religion. Their complaint deserved an answer.
Indeed, the opinions of students and others on campus, and of
alumni and donors off-campus, about the school's mission all should
be taken seriously. Taking them seriously implies subjecting them
to critical analysis, and considering them in light of normative
criteria: the institution's bylaws, applicable local, state, and federal
regulations, and, most importantly, the institution's statement of
its common good. If a proffered opinion is sound, it should be
incorporated into the mission statement, or bylaws, or some other
authoritative document. If the opinion is unsound, it should be
respectfully rejected.
It was no answer to these objectors to present terms that some
influential group happened to ratify. The "compromise" renders
the Wren Chapel and the William & Mary it "defines" a bit less
Christian than it was, but still palpably religious. The "compromise"
thus gives the institution a deep, even transcendent, meaning and
significance-what could be called William & Mary's "civil religion."
The parties seem to want to affirm an important and even central
role for religion at the College. Their desire to do so is not wrong-
headed. But presenting it as what those who count desire, or as an
outcome brokered by those who strove mightily for "balance," is no
answer to the objection.
What is missing from the resolution of the cross controversy is a
critically justified account of religion's role at a public university.
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The first ingredient of that is the concept of an objective institu-
tional common good. A real answer to the objectors on grounds of
institutional misidentity would include a reasoned statement of
what religion has to do with William & Mary, a critical defense of
that statement, and an argument for how it applies to the Wren
Chapel Cross.
Every human community has a common good-a unifying
principle, goal, or purpose toward which members of that commu-
nity cooperate. Not every group of people, however, is a community.
Folks jammed onto an elevator or into a subway car are not a
community. They make up a crowd, an aggregate, just so many
individuals brought together by each one's goal of getting home for
the six o'clock news or, maybe, for a Wheel of Fortune re-run. Their
interests converge. But they do not possess a genuinely common
good. On the subway, no one's cooperation with the others is needed
to satisfy anyone's goals. One would get home just as happily, or
unhappily, if the train happened to be empty. In these situations,
and in many others, because there is no genuine common good,
there is no community.
The existence of a common good designates a group or crowd as
a community. The content of its common good establishes it as the
distinctive community it is. To describe a community's common
good is to describe its identity or mission. Part of any community's
common good is generic. In other words, the common good of, say,
a business corporation as such is different from the common good of
a university, of a family, or of a religious congregation as such; but,
all business corporations have a common core mission. The rest of
the common good of a community is particular. Its generic identity
as a business corporation is the foundation of the distinctive
common good of Verizon or Nestl6 or Google.
Where does one find a statement of a community's common good?
In constitutions, articles of incorporation, legislative charters,
"mission" declarations, "statements of purpose," founding documents
of principle, even in "vision statements." Some elements of a
community's common good may be inferred from long practice,
elements discernibly ratified over time by the community's leaders
as part of their basic identity. As time goes by, special commissions
or committees may propose amendments to a charter or other
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authoritative articulation of that community's common good. Such
bodies may clarify through careful review and criticism just what
it is the outfit is really about.
Some examples of terse mission statements-and these refer to
no particular existing institution: "A liberal arts college in the Jesuit
Catholic tradition"; "A brotherhood of craft workers organized to
promote fellowship among its members and to improve their
working conditions through collective bargaining with manage-
ment"; "An association of all those interested in the preservation of
America's traditional civil liberties, willing to act through recog-
nized political channels to preserve them against conspiracies to
subvert them"; or, even, the Preamble to the Constitution of the
United States or almost any other political constitution.
Communities supplement their foundational principles in various
ways. A business corporation does so by the company's participation
in a certain industry in a certain place. A university does so by
adopting bylaws. They both do so by instigating practices to run the
operation day-to-day, and by treating employees and customers in
certain distinctive ways.
Universities are communities distinguishable from corporations
and other types of schools by a distinctive common good. The core of
any college's mission consists of cultivating intellectual virtues
among its members, increasing everyone's knowledge of the truth,
and developing students' human potentialities. William & Mary is
no exception.
Colleges and universities fill out this generic identity with all
sorts of emphases and additional touches. There are research
universities and teaching colleges. There are public, private non-
religious, and private religious kinds of each. Most institutions of all
these kinds are distinguished further by species-distinguishing
emphases. Sometimes it is special devotion to an area of knowledge:
there are technical colleges, liberal arts schools, and universities
especially devoted to teaching and research in the natural sciences.
Public colleges and universities occasionally take on the complexion
of industries important in the area-agriculture, mining, or high
technology. Local color and the accidents of history may filter into
a college's identity and imperceptibly become part, not of its basic
purpose or common good, but of its distinctive way of performing
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that mission. Williamsburg, the Wren Chapel, and, perhaps,
Anglicanism achieved this status at William & Mary.
To say that any community's common good is divisive, or that it
creates "insiders" and "outsiders," is-strictly speaking-incoherent.
It is akin to saying that what unites the community divides it. This
is as true of colleges as it is of other communities. Cries of "divisive-
ness" may nonetheless indicate that a group's identity is changing,
or that some members think it is, or that the criers have lost track
of what the outfit is fundamentally about. Then it is time for a
community retreat, to get its members back on track. But once all
the complaints have been investigated and when the community's
common good has been ratified, cries of "division" do not suggest any
institutional pathology. They rather signal the presence of those
discussed in Part I: the failing student, the VMI pacifist, and so
many others who really are "outsiders."
Knowledge of the truth and transmission of it. Cultivation of
intellectual virtues. Development of students' human potentialities.
These are the cornerstones of any university's raison d'etre, its basic
mission, its common good. There is an important and essential role
for religion in this great undertaking. A frank recognition and
candid defense of it was sorely missing in the William & Mary cross
controversy. Once that role is clarified, stated, and defended,
however, there is no more cogency in cries that religion divided the
College than that a fetish for the life of the mind divided it.
V. TWO PRINCIPLES OF THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN A PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY
The first principle of the role of religion in a public university is
that its role is, in principle, no different than that at any university,
save that no public university may affirm, ratify, or endorse any
particular religion as true. This first principle does not itself settle
any question about the role of religion on campus. It rather throws
the questions at William & Mary, for example, into the same
tradition of inquiry that other colleges mine for answers.
The second principle is this: public universities must and there-
fore should recognize religion as a distinct and irreducible aspect of
human flourishing. They must and therefore should affirm that
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religion is a genuine human good. Based upon this recognition, a
university-including a public university-will promote religion on
campus in suitable ways as an aspect of healthy collegiate life.
A. Campus Community Life
At any college or university there is a teeming of extra-curricular
life: athletic teams, social functions (dances and the like), cultural
events, and all the interactions of daily life outside the classroom
and library. At residential colleges this life can resemble that of a
small town, with postal services to the dorms, health care facilities,
food service, on-campus bistros, ample shopping and workout
spaces, and all of the other accouterments of community life
anywhere.7" Those in authority on especially, but not only, residen-
tial campuses need a broad and sound understanding of human
potentialities-and what serves to develop them-if they are to do
their jobs.
Saying this is not to say or imply that campus authorities should
act in loco parentis. Saying this is not to imply or suggest that
campus authorities' jurisdiction extends to all aspects of any
student's well-being. Even the parents of an eighteen to twenty-two-
year-old son or daughter should respect the freedom and privacy of
that young adult. Most parents eventually learn to do so. Campus
authorities' job descriptions regarding the collegiate-that is,
community-life of students do not extend to taking charge of their
character development or to punishing them simply for acting
immorally. Their task is to maintain conditions conducive to each
community member's pursuit of an education. These conditions
include limitations upon what some students may habitually be
inclined to do, and that which may seem innocuous or even "cool" to
do: playing loud music in the dorm, dressing so immodestly as to
distract other people from their work, or "putting down" people by
ad hominem attacks. But campus rules prohibiting these acts need
not be seen as "paternalistic." They are promulgated so that fair and
considerate cooperation for the common good of the institution may
more easily occur.
78. Some of the larger public campuses in this country are, in fact, the size of small cities.
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Among the important activities that any college should promote
and aid is the religious quest and life of the students. Campus
authorities' role in this matter is subsidiary: it is to assist the
student in carrying on his or her religious search and in fulfilling
his or her religious obligations. Part of the reason for this important
but ancillary role is the limited competence of campus authority. It
is not their job to make people religious by, for example, requiring
chapel attendance. In truth, no one really can make anyone else
religious. Religion consists fundamentally of interior acts of assent
to truths and of voluntary adhesion to a way of life. Someone has to
freely and genuinely choose to embrace a faith as part of his or her
own self-definition; otherwise, he or she is not really, or at least not
fully and genuinely, religious, and might just be going through the
motions.
But people commonly need some help in carrying on the religious
life they have chosen for themselves. And various human authori-
ties-political, cultural, social, or educational-can encourage others
to engage the largest question of meaning and value-that is, the
religious question. These authorities may promote and encourage
religion in various non-coercive ways, and should practically assist
and aid those who ask for it.
Colleges-especially but not only those that require on-campus
residence for students-are obliged to help make chaplains, wor-
ship, and counseling available at convenient locations and at times
appropriate to students' religious calendars. Colleges should also
accommodate students' religious practices when they conflict with
college-imposed obligations. Absent extraordinary justification,
there should be no exams or other performances on religious holy
days absent an opportunity to make up the work without penalty
another time. Colleges should not obstruct students' access to
religious speakers of the students' choices. Thus lecture halls and
other facilities should be made available during noncurricular
hours.
There is no need to further catalog a college's duties towards
religion. The duties listed above, among others, are routinely
performed by those running public colleges without serious objection
around campus to their doing so. Some of the duties, such as equal
access to campus facilities for religious speakers, are even legally
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required.79 It is important for present purposes to establish only
that colleges have some such duties, and that performing them
implies recognizing religion as a distinct and basic good. In other
words, colleges must "endorse" religion if they are to do their job
when it comes to sustaining collegiate life.
In order for a college to perform its important but subsidiary role,
college authorities cannot remain "neutral" about religion in
general.'0 They cannot discharge their duties in this area while
affirming nothing of significance about religion. College authorities
do not need to affirm a particular religion or to endorse any or every
student's version of what is true about God and faith. But they must
pick out religion from the other voluntary undertakings of students,
keep that understanding or definition of religion firmly in hand, and
then do a great number of things to promote it. That is what I mean
when I say that they have to recognize religion as a distinct and
irreducible good.
College authorities cannot discharge these responsibilities by
viewing religion under some nonreligious description-say, as one
more "discussion group activity," like the Debate or Forensic Clubs;
as an "arts activity," like a capella singers or the Savoyards; or as an
"ideological club," like the Greens or College Republicans. Worship
and prayer cannot be assimilated to such undertakings. Colleges
operate under self-imposed imperatives to promote religious
activities on campus that they would never apply equally to, say,
Gilbert & Sullivan. Besides, the law for good reason forbids
discrimination in admission and in hiring on grounds of religion,8 '
but does not do so for taste in music.
College authorities cannot treat religion as simply another
"private" student activity with which they had best not interfere.
Even a college with a laissez faire approach to students' sexual
activities should not, and probably would not, say that exams
must be scheduled around religious holy days-and also whenever
79. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000) (prohibiting the restriction of limited open fora on the
basis of religious or other speech content).
80. For the opposite view, see Chemerinsky, supra note 70, at 2211 (arguing that a
bedrock principle of religion in the public university is "that a public university should be
strictly secular in all the university does").
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination on
religious grounds).
20081 2251
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
students like to have sex. Colleges may choose not to interfere with
students' sexual immoralities, even when concern for public decency
and the sensibilities of other students would call for action. But the
same colleges would scarcely promote such acts as they would
religious activities, would never publicly advertise and house orgies
as they would religious assemblies, and would never tell professors
to accommodate students' sexual habits as they would tell profes-
sors to work around religious holy days.
B. Intellectual Life on Campus
The heart of every college's common good is its intellectual life.
The collegiate atmosphere of the place is important, especially to the
well-rounded development of students. But some colleges have no
resident students. Some commuter schools have no real campus,
and may only have scant traces of the student social and cultural
life that make up other colleges' rich collegiate atmospheres. But
commuter colleges are colleges all the same. Their core mission
comprises those things that make up the mission of the largest
residential institution: teaching, learning, scholarship, and stu-
dent flourishing-which includes the transmission of extant
knowledge, the cultivation of intellectual virtues, and--especially at
research universities-what is usually called the "production" of
new knowledge.
What is the role of religion in this core activity? Public universi-
ties are bound to be awash in the study of religion. They must not
discriminate in faculty hiring against persons with religious
convictions-even strong religious convictions. They must not
discriminate against religious viewpoints.8 2 Given the prevalence of
devout believers in the United States, these rules of nondiscrimina-
tion are likely to yield at any public university a significant number
of professors who are devout religious believers. At any public
university that teaches humanities and social sciences-which is to
say, at almost any public university-the classroom study of religion
is inevitable. Any decent curriculum in anthropology, literature,
history, philosophy, international relations, sociology, music, or art,
82. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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among other disciplines, will include sustained encounters with
religious people and ideas. These departments will probably list
whole courses on religious matters, such as: 'The Bible as History";
"Scripture as Literature"; "Islam in the Modern World"; "Sacred
Music in the Middle Ages"; "Religion and Party Affiliation During
Reconstruction"; "The Role of Missionaries in Colonizing Africa";
and the like. These courses do not presuppose the truth of any
particular religion. They do, however, present serious people who
sincerely believed in religious ideas. Teachers and students in these
courses will take these people seriously and study their effects upon
human affairs. Otherwise, what is the point of assigning their
works, or works about them?
A public university should not have a theology department.
Theology is classically described as "faith seeking understanding." 3
Theology presupposes a definite set of faith commitments; the
intellectual explanation and exploration of these commitments are
the tasks of theologians. These tasks are best left to those who
believe. It is not that public universities may not have professors
who are theologians; it is that having one department of theology is
hard to imagine without it being identified with a particular faith
tradition. Avoiding endorsement of one faith over another would
probably require several such departments.
Many European universities, on the other hand, have prestigious
chairs in theology, often reserved for designees of some ecclesiastical
authority. Public universities in America often have analogous
professorships, and may consult ecclesiastical authority before
filling them. The search committee for a chair in "Catholic Studies"
might consider the opinion of a local Catholic bishop in the process,
lest the college appoint someone whose reputation or status as a
member of that church is poor, and thus defeat, at least partly, the
value of the appointment. None of these practices raises an
interesting constitutional question.
83. This statement is attributed to Saint Anselm of Cambridge. See Gareth Matthews,
Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANSELM 65 (Brian
Davies & Brian Leftow eds., 2004).
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Many public universities have departments of religion.' They
are usually populated largely by individuals who would qualify as
theologians within a particular faith. These departments create no
interesting constitutional problem, even though their presence
implies that religion is a distinct phenomenon, that study of it is a
distinct discipline, and that it is important enough for students to
know about religion to justify creating a department to do so. They
create no interesting problem because diverse faculty members and
course listings alleviate the possibility of "endorsing" any particular
faith. The only possible constitutional objection left would be to say
that having a religion department "endorses" religion. Indeed it
does. But the "endorsement" test must be mistaken if it entails that
public universities must not recognize, teach, and study so large and
so important a part of experience as religion.
A public university's religion department should not be sectarian;
it should not affirm or even favor any particular faith as true or
valid. The First Amendment requires that. Even so, an American
public university's religion department is likely to "favor" courses
about Christianity. Demographics, student interest, American his-
tory, and the tradition of scholarly investigation into that theologi-
cal tradition all make this outcome likely. "Neutrality" among faiths
in this context, as in many others, cannot be a raw numeric thing.
Any such preponderance of Christian course offerings raises no
constitutional problem, because it does not owe to the college's
conviction that Christian revelation is true.
There is, then, no real possibility of a public university's religion
department being thoroughly "neutral" about religion. That religion
is a distinct and valuable intellectual subject matter is the depart-
ment's justification. Having a religion department entails that there
is more to religion than its accompanying psychology, its political
effects, its expression in art, music, and literature, and so on.
Otherwise, courses in those departments would exhaust the matters
worth studying.
84. See, e.g., University of North Carolina Department of Religious Studies, http://www.
unc.edu/depts/reLstud/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2008); University of Virginia
Department of Religious Studies, http://www. virginia.edu/religiousstudies/ (last visited Mar.
30, 2008); William & Mary Religious Studies Department, http://www.wm.edu/
religiousstudies/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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When any university founds or maintains a religion department,
it is not like adding or keeping any other department. Religion is not
just another scholarly discipline. The subject matter of religion is
not just one more aspect of nature-biochemistry, for example--or
of social life-for example, political science. Adding gender studies
or nuclear physics as a university's twentieth or thirtieth depart-
ment does not alter the character of the place. It does not change or
even greatly affect its intellectual culture. Adding a religion
department does, or at least it should. Adding another social studies
or natural science or humanities department does not, or not often,
present a potential challenge to who anyone in that community
really is, or, to put it prosaically, what it all means. Few people on
any campus regard creation of an education or botany department
as an existential challenge. Yet believers and unbelievers agree that
whether you are one or the other makes a huge difference to one's
identity.
The difference between a campus culture in which there is an
institutional witness to the fact or possibility of a greater-than-
human source of meaning and value to what we do, and one in
which the school's horizon is limited to this world, is no matter of
degree. The institutional difference is so large that "neutrality"
between the two possibilities is scarcely imaginable. To put religion
out there as a distinct-and, given its nature, obviously impor-
tant-field of inquiry is to open up a world of possibilities that no
other institutional move can possibly open. Many people on a given
campus may oppose precisely such a move. It is likely that most, if
not almost all of them, hold that religion is a fable. They hold that
religion is a vast and awe-inspiring human projection, but that is all
that it is. To adapt Gertrude Stein's opinion of Oakland, there is no
there, there: 5 religion is a distinct but strictly human phenomenon,
even though admittedly the humans being studied believed that
there is a transcendent reality with which they sought some
harmony.
To this challenge I submit this two-part response. The first part
is that we may have come across an implication of the constitutional
norm that binds public universities-an implication that puts
85. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
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private schools in a different position. No law prohibits a group of
dedicated atheists from setting up a school in which they mean to
educate atheists; perhaps some readers think this describes many
colleges these days. So long as these "free-thinkers" abide by
nondiscrimination laws, they are free to define the common good of
their institution in strictly materialist terms. As the Cornell
astronomer Carl Sagan famously said, 'The Cosmos is all that is or
ever was or ever will be."8
The problem for public schools inclined towards Saganism is
that the Constitution forbids them to disparage religion. The
Establishment Clause's neutrality norm prohibits entrepreneurial
public school atheists from asserting, implicitly or otherwise, that
religion is a delusion. Thus, public universities may not be at liberty
to forego a religion department for the reason that religion is false.
Such a decision may be justified by budgetary constraints, a rational
division of labor among several schools in the one state system,
emphases upon science or social studies, or lack of student interest
-but not on grounds of a disbelief.
The first part of this Essay's response, in other words, is that the
law may, in some sense and other things being equal, call for a
religion department at public universities. More important is the
undeniable truth that the law surely permits it. Although it is
reasonably clear that materialist or atheistic convictions may not be
acted upon by those in charge of public university curricula and
structure, belief in a greater-than-human source of meaning and
value certainly may be. Leaders who do so believe, then, should-
given the stakes involved and the impossibility of neutrality--create
and maintain a department of religion, or provide some equivalent
impetus for the integration of religion into campus intellectual life.
This is the second part of this Essay's response. It is also the third
principle of religion's role in the public university: public universi-
ties are prima facie obligated to create a department of religion, or
its substantial equivalent, in order to satisfy their duty towards
students to introduce them to all aspects of the truth about the
universe in which they live.
86. CARL SAGAN, COSMOS 1 (1985).
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VI. OBJECTIVE TRUTH AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The academic culture of universities is often said to be a "market-
place of ideas.""7 The description is apt. In financial and commodi-
ties markets, there is no overarching or canonical set of indubitably
right outcomes, no uniquely right or perfect end-state. The economic
marketplace is the scene of constant buying and selling, bounded by
rules of fair and orderly exchange. After that, to each his own. It is
the realm of "private ordering." In the sense established by these
observations, there is no "truth" in the marketplace.
The intellectual collaboration that takes place on campus resem-
bles such a marketplace. Academic exchanges operate according to
norms of relentless, perpetual inquiry. There is no final resting
place in view, no perfect resolution, no ending. Intellectual life at
universities is governed by norms of scholarly exchange. Whatever
emerges from discourse and debate guided by those rules is the
state of play, at least for now. No higher pedigree of correctness is
really within the world of the "marketplace of ideas."
The rules of this intellectual marketplace are plentiful. They
include respect for and willingness to listen to differing points of
view; no ad hominem attacks and arguments, because the truth or
validity of any proposal is logically independent of anyone who holds
it; an abiding willingness to give reasons, argument, and evidence
for any proposal one advances; and an understanding that nothing
but the force of argument is to carry a conclusion to acceptance-
neither coercion, nor inducements, nor anything else is a legitimate
part of the search for truth.
A casual observer of our admittedly ideally depicted "marketplace
of ideas" might look at it and say, 'Truth is the enemy of free
inquiry." This naive observer might say that there is no truth on
campus, that there are only questions and no "answers." This ob-
server might therefore object to this Essay's theses about institu-
tional affirmations in favor of religion, saying, 'That's contrary to
the nature of the place as a 'marketplace of ideas."'
87. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (observing that "[t]he
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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This objection founders upon a misunderstanding of the limited
and axiomatic nature of the marketplace rules. The rules of campus
inquiry-like those of economic markets-are not incompatible with
the existence and the participants' affirmation of a great number of
truths about the marketplace. The "marketplace of ideas" presup-
poses many truths, including some that market participants are
free to debate and deny. This asymmetry might strike our casual
observer as strange, and perhaps as incoherent. But the market as
an intelligible practice that an institution might reasonably support,
and as a practice worth any conscientious person's participation,
surely rests upon an ample portion of such truths.
Among the truths that the market presupposes are: the possi-
bility of discovering the truth through exchange; that rational
discourse is the method by which truth is discovered; that inquirers
are beings who deserve a certain respect; that inquirers are the sort
of beings who respond to argument; that inquirers are also the sort
of beings who are morally obliged to assent to truths once the
reasons for doing so are made plain; and that inquirers will abandon
false proposals once their falsity is demonstrated. After all, what is
the point of setting up an exercise to discover truth if no one has
obligations to the truth once it is discovered?
There is another sort of asymmetry in this marketplace's rela-
tionship to institutional affirmations of truth. Many questions of
human rights, morality, authority, and the whole point of learning
are freely debated at colleges as part of the intellectual give-and-
take. Yet the institution is never in doubt about them. Examples of
truths that colleges as institutions robustly affirm and stubbornly
defend include moral norms about how to treat people. Therefore,
even though individuals are free to dispute the premise, the college
will surely see that there is no human experimentation or use of
degrading epithets on campus. Large questions about the existence
of morally legitimate political authority are mooted on campuses
while the campus police enforce order in the lecture hall. People on
campus are free to dispute, criticize, and even to reject the institu-
tion's mission statement. But their freedom to do so does not lessen
the objective and obligatory character of the college's common good.
Nor is it a criticism of the institutional action predicated upon it.
2258 [Vol. 49:2217
RELIGION AT A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,
UVA's standard agreement governing aid to student groups pro-
vided that the benefits "should not be misinterpreted as meaning
that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University,
that the University is responsible for the organizations' contracts or
other acts or omissions, or that the University approves of the
organizations' goals or activities.""8 The institution, by this means,
distinguished its viewpoint from that of the speakers it funded. It
could therefore affirm what speakers denied, and vice versa. Even
so, it is very unlikely that the University would ever approve a
grant to a student group that put on black-face minstrel shows, or
that promoted Holocaust denial, or that published a lampoon de-
voted entirely to caricatures of Muslims. The institutions' overriding
obligations of basic human respect would trump the putative
freedom of marketplace participants.
Much more could be said about the intricate relationship between
the axiomatic skepticism of intellectual exchange on campus and
institutional affirmations of truth, including the truth about
religion. Those additional complexities are not necessary, however,
to refute our casual observer's objection. Colleges and universities
affirm a great many truths, and we are all the better for it. The
"marketplace of ideas" is the better for it. So the objection fails.
CONCLUSION
Moving an object-any object, including the Christian cross-from
one physical position to another is a chunk of behavior, an observ-
able event in time and space, a raw datum. It is, so far described, an
unintelligible occurrence. It is not yet a human act. The difference
between raw behavior and a human act is the difference between
saying "someone with a knife cut into the flesh" and saying "the
surgeon began the operation," or "the assailant stabbed his victim,"
or "the coroner began the autopsy," or "the cook turned quickly and
accidentally cut her helper's arm." Same behavior, different acts-
with very different attendant moral evaluations and legal conse-
quences.
88. 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
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Consider the behavior described by onlookers as "he drove his car
right into her and killed her." A first-year law student might be
snookered by his professor into demanding arrest and prosecution
of the driver. But snookered only once. For the student will be
immediately made to see that the same behavior could be murder,
if the driver meant to kill the pedestrian; manslughter, if the driver
was drunk; criminally negligent homicide, if the driver was speeding
and failed to heed a stop sign; civil wrongful death, if the driver
failed to keep a proper lookout; or merely an accident for which the
driver bears no legal responsibility. Same behavior, different acts,
with very different moral evaluations and legal consequences. The
novice law student jumped the gun. One cannot begin to morally
and legally judge anyone's behavior without more. That is because
one cannot know what anyone is actually doing unless one knows
what they are up to, what they are trying to accomplish. Human
acts are identifiable by their object. What anyone is doing is a
function of what they are thinking about and choosing to do.
So the question, Was President Nichol right to move the Wren
Chapel Cross? is impossible to answer. Relocating the cross from
Point A to Point B is a chunk of raw behavior. It is not yet a human
act susceptible of evaluation. The question, Was President Nichol
right to move the cross to make the Wren Chapel equally welcoming
to everyone? is, on the other hand, quite intelligible. And the answer
is no. What if he moved the cross to make everyone feel equally at
home, or to, at least initially, secularize the Wren Chapel? The
answer also is no. All these acts were seriously misguided, and
rightly opposed, for the reasons presented earlier in this Essay.
Moving the cross could have been a very different act, with a
different evaluative conclusion in tow. The College of William &
Mary is not a Christian institution, much less is it an Anglican one.
It is a public institution in which religion and the religious life of its
members have important roles. But constitutional law, if nothing
else, prohibits William & Mary from affirming the truth of Chris-
tianity, or of any other particular set of revealed truths. This is not
to say that leaving the cross where it was in September 2006 would
have been wrong. It is to say that, because William & Mary is
legally disabled from consistently witnessing to the truth of
Christianity, concern for the integrity of the Christian message
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could have prompted calls to move the cross after, for example, the
College sponsored a sex workers' gala.89 Then, highly motivated,
probably Christian, alumni might have demanded a separation of
the College from the Chapel--or some sort of de-Anglicanization of
it-precisely to protect the integrity of the faith. If the behavior of
moving the cross were the act of forestalling scandal, supporting it
could even be the duty of those alumni who criticized Nichol.
What should President Nichol have done in response to the
complaints he received about the Wren Chapel? One reasonable
response would have been to leave the cross alone. The complaints
presented a golden opportunity for Nichol to clarify the role of
religion and of the Wren Chapel at William & Mary. He could have
started by emphasizing that William & Mary is a public institution
that does not endorse Anglicanism, or Christianity in general, over
other religions. He could have further explained that the historical
fact of the matter is, the College was blessed with a magnificent
symbolic affirmation of the vital role that religion plays in the
collegiate and intellectual life of the school. The Chapel's Christian
provenance and appearance accented its appeal for many. But for
everyone at the College this unique and revered space reflected the
crucial place of religion in the school's common good, or mission.
Nichol might further have said that not everyone will find the
Chapel endearing or inspiring, just as not everyone finds the College
art gallery, or its historical relationship to Anglicanism or to the Old
South, or its predominantly secular character edifying. Nichol could
have proposed that the Wren Chapel-like every other building,
class, and event on campus-is more or less "fully" experienced by
different people. That is the way it goes with symbols.
Nichol might also have said that, though William & Mary may be
unusual for being a state school that started as a sectarian institu-
tion, many of today's private secular universities started that way.
Harvard and Yale are the most prominent of many examples.
Institutions of this latter sort commonly retain and use buildings
encrusted with the trappings of religious sponsorship long since
abandoned. There is no big deal on those campuses about it. There
need not be at William & Mary.
89. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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Nichol could have then confessed, as he did during the contro-
versy, that for Christians such as himself, "the cross conveys an
inspiring message of sacrifice, redemption and love."9° He clearly
regarded this as a private meaning, but it need not be so cabined.
Nichol might have said that the meaning of the cross was not
exhausted on Christians. The cross, he could have said, possessed
some meaning for everyone as an example or illustration of certain
universal values, such as "love" and "sacrifice" and, perhaps,
"redemption" of a sort. One does not have to affirm the truth of
Christian revelation to affirm that, within the realm of human
understanding, the man who died on the cross was put to death for
his convictions, and possessed some sense of laying down his life for
the sake of others.
Nichol could have added that the College's "storied traditions"
and the numeric preponderance of Christians at William & Mary
made the Wren Chapel the right venue for many of the College's
high-end occasions. Religion almost always comes packaged in real
sectarian trappings. It is not that there is no such thing as "natural"
religion, the core philosophical truths about God available to human
reason. It is that almost no actual believer stops there. Surely no
worshiping community on campus does. The institution's endorse-
ment of religion must necessarily often be by and through favor
towards local sectarian expressions such as the Wren Chapel. So
long as necessary steps are taken to make clear that William &
Mary is not an Anglican institution, this necessity is close enough
to a virtue.
What about the complex behavioral mosaic described on the first
page of this Essay-the "compromise?" Precisely as a "compromise"
of incompatible feelings engendered by the cross, the settlement
deserves harsh criticism. The terms agreed upon may still be sup-
portable, though, so long as they are separated from the misguided
process that gave them life. The terms announced are consonant
with-though not required by-a sound understanding of religion's
role at a public university. These terms could be defended as an
intelligible and prudent adjustment to better foster that role.
Though the Board of Visitors did not say so, its intent appears to
90. E-mail from Gene R. Nichol, supra note 15.
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have been to explain the preeminence of this particular religious
symbol as an artifact of tradition and history, and not as evidence
of the College's conviction that Anglicanism, or Christianity in
general, was superior or favored--or true. If the Board had said
that, it would have been close to right.
The compromise reflected the Board's conviction that the Wren
Chapel needed to keep its Christian heritage to remain connected
with some institutional stakeholders, including the many alumni
for whom the Chapel as it was looms large in fond memories. The
Board of Visitors also asserted that the Chapel needed to be a
"living space" for all sorts of "religious and spiritual observance" in
order to connect it to other stakeholders, perhaps chiefly contempo-
rary students and faculty.9' The terms agreed upon made the Wren
Chapel more suitable for non-Christian religious events, even as its
traditional identity as a distinctively Christian space was main-
tained. If the Board's announcement had included a forthright
affirmation of religion's central significance to the College's life and
study today as ever, the stipulations described above would be
supportable.
91. Board of Visitors Statement, supra note 44.
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